Manage­ment Par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on Pro­grams — Cur­rent mar­ket con­di­ti­ons requi­re new struc­tu­ring methods

The cur­rent pre­vai­ling sel­ler mar­ket com­bi­ned with high purcha­se pri­ces and the new tax juris­dic­tion of the finan­cial courts have an impact on the struc­tu­ring of manage­ment par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on pro­grams (PPPs).

MPP in focus – At MUPET 2019, Alexander Götz (left; Blättchen & Partner), Dr. Barbara Koch-Schulte and Dr. Benedikt Hohaus (both P+P Pöllath + Partners) present the latest developments in management investments.

At MUPET 2019, Prof. Dr. Alex­an­der Götz (left; Blätt­chen & Part­ner), Dr. Bar­ba­ra Koch-Schul­te and Dr. Bene­dikt Hohaus (both P+P Pöllath + Part­ners) pre­sent the latest deve­lo­p­ments in manage­ment par­ti­ci­pa­ti­ons | Source: Gregg Thor­ne

Clas­si­cal struc­tu­ring and pos­si­ble alter­na­ti­ves

The clas­sic equi­ty par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on of the manage­ment in the con­text of an LBO is pre­do­mi­nant­ly struc­tu­red in the form of a dis­pro­por­tio­na­te sub­scrip­ti­on of pre­fer­red instru­ments (share­hol­der loans or pre­fer­red shares) as well as clas­sic equi­ty by the manage­ment (sweet equi­ty).

As an alter­na­ti­ve, a pari pas­su invest­ment by the mana­ger (i.e. a pro­por­tio­nal invest­ment) is now incre­asing­ly sup­ple­men­ted with a bonus. The bonus is due for pay­ment depen­ding on the eco­no­mic deve­lo­p­ment of the tar­get com­pa­ny and is sub­ject to a lea­ver sche­me and, in some cases, ves­t­ing. As the Pari Pas­su Invest­ment does not have a Lea­ver Sche­me and thus no fur­ther link to the employ­ment rela­ti­onship, the mini­mum requi­re­ments of the Ger­man Fis­cal Court (BFH) case law assu­me that the invest­ment is taxed as capi­tal inco­me (see recent BFH dated 04.10.2016 — IX R 43/15). The bonus, on the other hand, is sala­ry that is sub­ject to inco­me tax.

US inves­tors often use so-cal­led hurd­le shares, which give the manage­ment sub­scrib­ing to them a share in the value deve­lo­p­ment only when the inves­tor has ear­ned his inves­ted capi­tal plus a mini­mum return. In exch­an­ge, the purcha­se pri­ce of the hurd­le shares is usual­ly very low. For tax reasons, the valua­ti­on should be docu­men­ted by an expert opi­ni­on of an inde­pen­dent third par­ty when the invest­ment is made. Whe­ther the pro­fits from hurd­le shares are sub­ject to capi­tal taxa­ti­on has not yet been sub­ject of a fis­cal court review.

Effects of high acqui­si­ti­on pri­ces on the struc­tu­ring pro­cess

The curr­ent­ly high acqui­si­ti­on pri­ces increase the manage­men­t’s risk of loss from an MPP invest­ment. This is becau­se the limit for rea­li­zing a loss is often rea­ched even with minor devia­ti­ons from the busi­ness plan or the valua­ti­on mul­ti­ple. This can be redu­ced by a hig­her pro­por­ti­on of mana­ger invest­ments in pre­fer­red instru­ments. Howe­ver, the upsi­de to be achie­ved then also decrea­ses.

This prompts inves­tors to offer mana­gers so-cal­led rat­chet-agree­ments in addi­ti­on to the clas­sic equi­ty invest­ment in order to make the MPP more attrac­ti­ve. Under the­se agree­ments, the mana­gers recei­ve an addi­tio­nal amount from the inves­tor from a cer­tain mini­mum money mul­ti­ple or mini­mum IRR, respec­tively, of the pro­ceeds acc­ruing abo­ve the thres­holds.

New case law of the finan­cial courts on sweet equi­ty

In con­nec­tion with a manage­ment par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on, the Finan­ce Court of Baden-Würt­tem­berg (ruling dated May 9, 2017 — 5 K 3825/14) ruled that the dis­pro­por­tio­na­te sub­scrip­ti­on of capi­tal instru­ments such as ordi­na­ry and pre­fer­red shares by a mana­ging direc­tor is not an indi­ca­ti­on that the MPP inco­me has been reclas­si­fied as sala­ries. The respec­ti­ve capi­tal instru­ments are to be con­side­red indi­vi­du­al­ly in their return. A com­pa­ri­son of the total return on the invest­ment of the mana­ger and the inves­tor would be an inad­mis­si­ble ex post con­side­ra­ti­on. If the inves­tor’s pro­fit had been lower, the mana­ger would also have bor­ne a hig­her risk of loss.

Howe­ver, ano­ther sena­te of the same court (ruling of 26.06.2017 — 8 K 4018/14) deci­ded in a com­pa­ra­ble case for a con­sul­tant that the gran­ting of the invest­ment, among other things becau­se of the asso­cia­ted chan­ce of achie­ving a dis­pro­por­tio­na­te­ly high return in the con­text of the over­all con­side­ra­ti­on, could cer­tain­ly qua­li­fy as an addi­tio­nal per­for­mance-rela­ted remu­ne­ra­ti­on for the con­sul­ting acti­vi­ty. The fact that the pro­ceeds on the capi­tal shares were iden­ti­cal for the con­sul­tant and the inves­tor when view­ed in iso­la­ti­on did not indi­ca­te other­wi­se. An iso­la­ted con­side­ra­ti­on does not ful­ly reflect the eco­no­mic con­tent of the total invest­ment of the inves­tors and mana­gers.

It remains to be seen how the Fede­ral Fis­cal Court will deci­de on this.

Insu­rance pro­tec­tion of pay­roll tax risk

The inco­me tax risk asso­cia­ted with MPPs is now insura­ble in Eng­land. Insu­rance com­pa­nies are now also try­ing to tap into the Ger­man mar­ket. The insu­rance covers the tax dif­fe­rence bet­ween capi­tal and inco­me taxa­ti­on and the neces­sa­ry defence cos­ts against pay­ment of a cor­re­spon­ding pre­mi­um. In return, howe­ver, the poli­cy­hol­der must dis­c­lo­se all infor­ma­ti­on and opi­ni­ons rele­vant to taxa­ti­on. Tax con­se­quen­ces rela­ted to valua­ti­on issues are not insu­red. It remains to be seen whe­ther and how the mar­ket for such insu­rance will deve­lop in Ger­ma­ny.

Manage­ment Gua­ran­tees

A sel­ler-fri­end­ly mar­ket has led to lean war­ran­ty cata­logs in SPAs, cou­pled with W&I insu­rance and a lia­bi­li­ty cap of EUR 1. It is a trend, espe­ci­al­ly among UK inves­tors, to reco­g­ni­se gua­ran­tees that the sel­ler does not pro­vi­de in the SPA to demand from manage­ment. In this respect, clas­sic SPA gua­ran­tees are part­ly out­sour­ced into a sepa­ra­te Manage­ment War­ran­ty Agree­ment to be gran­ted by manage­ment. W&I insu­rance is also pos­si­ble for this pur­po­se.

Res­truc­tu­ring of MPPs in cri­sis

Due to eco­no­mic deve­lo­p­ments, some port­fo­lio com­pa­nies have recent­ly been taken over by banks for coven­ant breaks or have even had to file for bank­rupt­cy. For an MPP, the neces­sa­ry res­truc­tu­ring of such com­pa­nies often means that even if the tur­n­around is suc­cessful, the inves­tor’s money mul­ti­ple on the ori­gi­nal­ly inves­ted equi­ty is no hig­her than 2x or even signi­fi­cant­ly lower, and the time until exit beco­mes signi­fi­cant­ly lon­ger. In line with the increased risk pro­fi­le, inte­rest rates or divi­dends on the pre­fer­red instru­ments run at inte­rest rates for lon­ger and the MPP has litt­le rea­li­stic chan­ce of attrac­ti­ve returns. Rather, the­re is a signi­fi­cant risk of a (total) loss. Often, the sce­na­rio is exa­cer­ba­ted by dilu­ti­on due to neces­sa­ry capi­tal increa­ses based on low valua­tions.

As in the 2007 finan­cial cri­sis, the­re will soon be an increase in the res­truc­tu­ring of MPPs. This can be done by sub­scrib­ing for com­mon shares or pre­fer­red instru­ments based on the sub­se­quent low valua­ti­on. A con­flict with an impair­ment test should be avo­ided. In addi­ti­on, mana­gers often have reser­va­tions about thro­wing good money back to the “bad” money. As an alter­na­ti­ve, only a bonus model in the form of a vir­tu­al share­hol­ding, ori­en­ted towards the deve­lo­p­ment of equi­ty value, remains.

Con­clu­si­on

The cur­rent high acqui­si­ti­on pri­ces lead to chan­ges in the struc­tu­ring of MPPs. Tax aspects must be taken into account. Howe­ver, some manage­ment teams are more likely to opt for risk reduc­tion and accept tax dis­ad­van­ta­ges. As the need for res­truc­tu­ring of port­fo­lio com­pa­nies increa­ses, the need for the res­truc­tu­ring of MPPs is also likely to increase. This is all the more true sin­ce the BFH will soon also com­ment on the tax tre­at­ment of sweet equi­ty.

 

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